Edward Kanterian, _Kant, God and Metaphysics: The Secret Thorn_, London and New York: Routledge, 2018 Pp. xvii + 444 ISBN 9781138908581 (hbk) £110.00 by Forman, David
1	
	
Edward	Kanterian,	Kant,	God	and	Metaphysics:	The	Secret	Thorn	
London	and	New	York:	Routledge,	2018	
Pp.	xvii	+	444		
ISBN	9781138908581	(hbk)		
	
David	Forman	
Kantian	Review,	25(3),	97-504	
	
[For	published	version,	see:	https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415420000187	
 
This	is	a	chronological	commentary	on	Kant’s	writings	through	1769	whose	aim	is	to	reveal	that	
the	‘secret	thorn’	driving	Kant’s	thought	through	its	twists	and	turns	is	the	scripture-based	faith	
of	the	German-Protestant	tradition.	On	Kanterian’s	telling,	Kant’s	1763	Beweisgrund	essay	aims	
to	‘build	a	metaphysical	fortress	for	his	articles	of	faith,	i.e.	to	defend	faith	through	knowledge.’	
This	essay	already	contains	the	seeds	of	the	skeptical	attitude	toward	any	such	‘metaphysical	
fortress’	that	emerges	in	the	1766	Dreams	and	subsequent	work	of	that	decade.	During	this	
period,	Kant	experiments	with	a	different	strategy	that	aims	instead	to	‘defend	faith	through	
ignorance’	(312).	Then,	starting	around	1769	and	continuing	through	the	critical	period,	Kant’s	
project	shifts	again:	he	aims	to	‘rebuild	a	metaphysical	fortress	around	his	faith’	(364). 
 
A	significant	hurdle	for	this	interpretation	is	that	Kant	does	not	describe	his	own	philosophical	
activity	this	way.	The	Beweisgrund	keeps	religion	within	the	boundaries	of	reason	to	the	extent	
that	it	offers	an	argument	for	God’s	existence	that	proceeds	by	means	of	an	analysis	of	
concepts	of	the	understanding.	And	even	if	the	Dreams	essay	marks	an	abandonment	of	the	
speculative	project	in	theology	that	culminates	in	the	works	of	1762/63,	Kant	does	not	retreat	
therein	to	a	fideism	of	the	sort	toward	which	Hamann	had	been	trying	to	push	him.	True,	Kant	
ends	the	Dreams	by	noting	that	skirmishes	among	metaphysicians	leave	untouched	the	truly	
upright	person’s	‘moral	faith’	in	a	future	life.	But	Kant	does	not	take	this	indifference	regarding	
metaphysical	theories	to	be	an	opportunity	to	champion,	say,	a	foundational	feeling	of	the	
divine	that	receives	content	from	scripture. 
 
In	the	critical	period,	Kant	famously	expresses	the	need	to	‘deny	knowledge	to	make	room	for	
faith’	(Bxxx).	But	he	persists	in	characterizing	the	religious-theological	content	of	the	Critique	as	
wholly	within	the	boundaries	of	reason	even	if	no	longer	of	knowledge:	the	idea	of	God	is	an	
idea	of	reason;	our	hope	for	a	future	life	is	an	expression	of	the	interests	of	reason;	and	the	
whole	history	of	speculation	regarding	a	supreme	being	is	part	of	the	history	of	reason.	
Although	Kant	reassures	his	readers	in	the	Religion	that	revelation	can	contain	the	religion	of	
reason	within	itself	(6:12),	he	also	claims	that	the	authors	of	scripture	themselves	accept	and	
report	the	events	of	sacred	history	because	moved	by	reason	to	do	so	(7:40).	By	contrast,	a	
faith	based	merely	on	alleged	miracles	or	the	testimony	of	others	‘is	in	no	way	a	part	of	religion’	
(7:42;	6:84.11-14).	Indeed,	since	the	authors	of	scripture	make	errors,	a	historical	faith	can	
become	compatible	with	religion	only	after	reason	corrects	it	(7:38,	41).	 
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For	Kanterian,	this	rationalism	turns	out	to	be	superficial.	He	reads	Kant	with	a	view	to	finding	
evidence	for	a	traditional	faith	lying	hidden	beneath	the	text,	hunting	for	places	where	Kant	
‘drops	his	academic	reservations	to	reveal	a	rather	ardent	faith’	(176).	Kanterian’s	approach	
thus	shares	something	with	Marxist,	psychoanalytic,	or	Straussian	hermeneutics. 
 
Kanterian’s	brief	introduction	aims	to	motivate	his	favored	hermeneutical	approach.	Taking	his	
cue	from	Gadamer,	Kanterian	claims	that	a	sophisticated	reading	must	‘historicise	Kant’	by	
understanding	his	explicit	arguments	as	‘built	on’	or	in	‘defense’	of	the	ideas	and	beliefs	that	
characterize	a	lived,	historically	situated	Weltanschauung	(xiv).	For	Kanterian,	this	
Weltanschauung	is	strictly	metaphysical-religious	in	character.	He	does	not	consider	whether	
any	political,	social,	economic,	or	idiosyncratic	psychological	forces	might	be	driving	Kant’s	
thought. 
 
This	brings	Kanterian	to	a	pointed	complaint:	Anglophone	Kant	scholarship—or	at	least	
‘prevailing’	Anglophone	scholarship—neglects	to	consider	Kant	in	this	national-religious	
historical	context.	The	result	of	this	neglect	is	a	naive	anachronism:	a	non-confessional	and	anti-
metaphysical	Kant	that	‘appeals	to	our	own,	more	secular	attitudes’	(xiii).	Kanterian	claims	that	
the	secular-scientific	outlook	informing	this	historically	naive	Anglophone	scholarship	has	an	
affinity	with	the	Marburg	neo-Kantianism	initiated	by	Hermann	Cohen	that	emphasizes	the	
transcendental-philosophical	underpinnings	of	natural	science,	mathematics,	and	logic.	This	is	
not	a	fair	assessment	of	the	breadth	of	approaches	in	Anglophone	Kant	scholarship—to	say	
nothing	of	Cohen	and	the	Marburg	school.	At	any	rate,	Kanterian	proclaims	his	preference	for	
the	outlook	of	anti-Marburg	scholars	such	as	Bruno	Bauch,	Heinz	Heimsoeth,	Max	Wundt,	and	
Martin	Heidegger.	As	examples	of	the	kind	of	approach	that	Anglophone	scholarship	has	failed	
to	give	‘due	weight’,	Kanterian	cites	Bauch’s	claim	from	1904	that	Kant’s	philosophy	gives	
rational	form	to	Luther’s	moral-religious	sentiment	and	Wundt’s	claim	from	1924	that	‘the	
revelation	of	God	in	the	world	was	the	actual	content	of	Kant’s	philosophy’	(xv).	 
 
Bauch	and	Wundt	are,	it	must	be	said,	unfortunate	choices	to	serve	as	models	for	a	historically	
informed	hermeneutic.	It	was	Bauch	who,	in	1917,	introduced	into	the	pages	of	the	Kant-
Studien	the	hermeneutic	principle	of	a	racial	horizon	of	understanding.	Significantly,	Bauch	
takes	his	cue	from	Treitschke’s	remark	that	Luther	remains	baffling	to	the	foreigner	but	as	
‘blood	of	our	blood’	is	innately	familiar	to	‘us	Germans’.	Bauch	generalizes	Treitschke’s	thought,	
concluding	that	‘where	we	cannot	say	“that	is	the	blood	of	our	blood”,	there	it	is	certain	that	
our	comprehension	simply	finds	a	limit’.	Bauch’s	barely	concealed	implication	is	that	a	Jew	like	
Hermann	Cohen	cannot	adequately	understand	Kant,	especially	in	his	moral-religious	
dimensions.	As	for	Wundt,	his	claim	that	the	‘actual	content’	of	Kant’s	philosophy	is	God’s	
revelation	in	the	world	assimilates	Kant	to	an	alleged	Christian-Germanic	‘völkische	
Weltanschauung’,	whose	‘actual	content’	is,	similarly,	the	‘reconciliation’	of	God	and	world.	For	
Wundt,	‘idealism’—whether	of	Plato,	Kant,	or	Hegel—is	merely	the	philosophical	expression	of	
this	primordial	Weltanschauung.	Any	contrary	tendencies	in	European	philosophy	toward	
metaphysical	materialism	or	political	egalitarianism	are	to	be	explained	by	the	malign	influence	
of	an	alien	Jewish	Weltanschauung,	whose	defining	feature	is	God’s	absence	from	the	world.	
Wundt	of	course	finds	that	this	also	characterizes	what	he	calls	the	‘Jewish	strand’	of	neo-
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Kantianism.	Wundt	brings	this	thought—at	once	laughable	and	despicable—full	circle	by	
identifying	Rasseforschung	as	the	contemporary	heir	to	philosophical	idealism’s	principle	of	the	
interpenetration	of	the	spiritual	and	material. 
 
To	be	clear,	Kanterian’s	reading	is	not	implicated	in	the	fundamentally	anti-Semitic	orientation	
of	these	approaches.	Nevertheless,	in	this	case,	it	is	Kanterian	who	appears	historically	naive	in	
his	uncritical	appeal	to	such	figures	in	support	of	reading	Kant’s	thought	as	a	philosophical	
expression	of	a	primordial	national-religious	Weltanschauung. 
 
In	keeping	with	his	Weltanschauung	hermeneutics,	Kanterian	warns	us	at	the	outset	that	he	will	
not	claim	any	direct	influence	of	Luther	on	Kant	(1).	Nor	does	he	wish	to	offer	a	comprehensive	
discussion	of	Kant’s	debts	to	prior	philosophers	or	theologians	(xvi).	This	accounts	for	the	
somewhat	unusual	structure	of	the	book:	his	300-page	commentary	on	Kant’s	texts	is	preceded	
by	an	88-page	chapter	presenting	a	whirlwind	intellectual	history	of	philosophical	and	religious	
thought	in	the	quarter	millennium	from	the	Reformation	to	the	Age	of	Enlightenment.	Here	
Kanterian	introduces	the	religious	‘themes’	he	finds	reemerging	in	Kant:	the	‘anxiety’	created	
by	the	modern	scientific	worldview	together	with	the	‘safety’	provided	by	faith;	and	the	
‘weakness	motif’,	according	to	which	human	reason	in	its	fallen	state	is	so	feeble	that	it	not	
only	fails	to	grasp	the	divine	but	is	also	likely	to	lead	us	away	from	authentic	faith.	Perhaps	
inevitably	given	the	dozens	of	figures	covered,	there	are	few	places	to	quibble	with	the	
presentation	of	this	history.	One	might	also	question	the	relative	lack	of	focus	on	the	German-
Protestantism	central	to	the	hermeneutic	principle	guiding	the	commentary.	Nevertheless,	the	
chapter	provides	a	good	sense	of	the	variety	of	views	in	the	period	on	the	question	of	status	of	
reason	vis-à-vis	faith	as	well	a	useful	entry	point	into	some	of	the	relevant	secondary	literature. 
 
Kanterian	finds	these	religious	themes	in	various	guises	in	virtually	all	modern	philosophers,	
from	Descartes	and	Locke	to	Hume.	Anti-dogmatism,	if	not	explicitly	atheistic,	is	always	
subservient	to	traditional	faith	because	reflective	of	the	‘weakness	motif’.	And	dogmatic	
metaphysics,	as	long	as	it	is	theistic,	is	also	always	merely,	in	Anselm’s	phrase,	‘faith	seeking	
understanding’:	Leibniz,	Wolff,	and	Baumgarten	are	all	‘God-obsessed’	(xiii);	their	natural	
theology	is	a	form	of	‘rational	apologetics’	(158).	Kanterian	does	not	say	whether	this	judgment	
also	applies	to	figures	such	as	Reimarus	and	Christian	Gabriel	Fischer,	whose	rationalism	pushes	
them	in	more	clearly	heterodox	directions	within	the	18th-century	Lutheran	context. 
 
Later	in	the	book,	Kanterian	adds	the	cross-cultural	religious	experience	of	the	‘numinous’	to	
his	arsenal	of	themes	allegedly	evidencing	Kant’s	pre-rational	religiosity	(127).	And	he	expands	
his	conception	of	the	relevant	explanatory	Weltanschauung	to	include	the	non-Christian	
religiosity	of	Proclus,	Plotinus,	and	Pythagoras	(108,	256,	380).	Insofar	as	this	expansion	links	
Kant	to	more	universal	expressions	of	religiosity,	it	somewhat	undercuts	Kanterian’s	attempt	to	
‘historicise’	Kant.	But	it	is	nevertheless	in	keeping	with	Kanterian’s	larger	vision:	to	understand	
Kant’s	religious	thought	not	as	an	isolated	product	of	an	impersonal	pure	reason	or	of	Kant’s	
own	peculiar	genius,	but	instead	as	part	of	a	continuing	tradition	of	religiously	grounded	
thought	and	thus	as	a	‘contribution	to	philosophia	perennis’	(xiv). 
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It	might	seem	strange	that	Kanterian	would	refer	approvingly	to	the	‘perennial	philosophy’.	This	
is	the	fanciful	historiography	of	philosophy	(concocted	by	early	Christian	apologists	and	revived	
in	the	Renaissance)	that	attributes	everything	valuable	in	pre-Christian	philosophy	to	more	or	
less	corrupted	traditions	originating	with	the	divine	revelations	given	to	Noah	or	Moses.	But	the	
reference	is	appropriate	in	the	sense	that	Kanterian,	too,	downplays	the	philosophical	content	
of	Kant’s	thought	in	favor	of	finding	its	deeper	core	in	a	revelation-based	metaphysical-religious	
Weltanschauung.	 
 
In	keeping	with	this	outlook,	Kanterian’s	introduction	does	not	provide	any	account	of	the	
content	or	significance	of	the	texts,	arguments,	or	philosophical	views	he	treats	in	his	
commentary.	Indeed,	the	commentary	itself	aims	less	at	developing	a	coherent	philosophical	
content	in	Kant’s	texts	than	at	finding	clues	in	those	texts	that	any	such	content	depends	on	a	
traditional	religiosity.	In	practice,	this	means	that	Kanterian	is	quick,	often	too	quick,	to	allege	
ambiguities,	errors,	confusions,	and	contradictions	in	Kant’s	thinking. 
 
Consider	Kanterian’s	commentary	on	Kant’s	first	extended	discussion	of	human	freedom	and	
sin,	which	appears	in	the	1755	Nova	dilucidatio.	Kant	defends	a	form	of	compatibilism	in	the	
text,	but	Kanterian	spends	several	pages	to	trying	to	make	sense	of	Kant	as	struggling	and	
failing	to	articulate	a	coherent	libertarian	view.	His	misunderstanding	of	the	dialectical	
structure	of	the	text	leads	him	to	claim	erroneously	that	Kant	denies	divine	foreknowledge—
and	then	to	complain	that	this	denial	‘stands	in	some	tension’	with	Kant’s	affirmation	that	our	
free,	evil	acts	can	be	foreseen	(137;	cf.	1:405.23–27,	1:400.14–17).	In	connection	with	this,	
Kanterian	also	misunderstands	Kant’s	short	but	important	dialogue	between,	as	Kant	says,	
‘Caius,	defender	of	the	indifference	of	equilibrium,	and	Titius,	advocate	for	the	determining	
ground’	(1:401).	Kanterian	mislabels	Caius	as	a	‘determinist’	and	Titius	as	‘a	libertarian	(or	
compatibilist?)’	and	then	misinterprets	their	statements	accordingly	(134–5).	Schönfeld	makes	
a	similar	error	in	his	own	commentary	(156–8),	which	raises	the	possibility	that	Kanterian	has	
relied	too	heavily	on	secondary	sources.	
 
There	is	not	the	space	here	to	assess	Kanterian’s	commentaries	on	individual	texts.	But	it	may	
be	useful	to	give	at	least	an	outline	of	his	commentary	on	the	Beweisgrund	essay.	Kanterian	
begins	by	defending	Kant’s	claim	against	the	Cartesian	ontological	argument	that	existence	is	
not	a	real	predicate.	Kanterian	reasons	that	if	existence	were	a	real	predicate	we	could	not	
meaningfully	talk	about	things	as	existing	only	contingently	(206).	But	Kanterian	considers	
Kant’s	own	proposal	for	an	a	priori	proof	for	God’s	existence	to	be	fatally	flawed	at	every	step.	
The	first	step	in	Kant’s	proposed	proof	is	something	like	this	argument:	possibility	rests	not	
merely	on	logical	non-contradiction,	but	also	on	some	material	data	existing	for	thought;	and	
since	it	is	impossible	that	there	is	no	possibility	whatever,	something	must	exist	(2:77–9).	
Kanterian	understands	the	argument	as	resting	on	the	semantic	principle	that	the	meaning	of	a	
word	is	ultimately	the	object	for	which	it	stands.	Kanterian	thus	claims	that	the	argument	does	
not	even	get	off	the	ground	since	words	like	“phlogiston”	can	be	perfectly	meaningful	although	
lacking	a	reference	(226). 
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Next,	Kant	argues	that	when	we	consider	‘the	absolute	possibility	of	all	things	in	general’	
(2:157)	we	can	see	that	there	is	an	absolutely	necessary	being,	a	being	the	cancellation	of	which	
would	cancel	all	internal	possibility	whatever	(2:83).	Kant	argues,	further,	that	this	being	is	
unique,	simple,	immutable,	and	eternal	(2:83–5).	Kanterian	claims	that	all	this	rests	on	a	basic	
petitio	(230):	Kant	says	nothing	that	rules	out	a	given	possibility	being	grounded	in	something	
contingent	(231);	thus,	the	inner	possibilities	of	things	could	themselves	be	contingent	(232).	
Next,	Kant	argues	that	this	necessary	being	is	the	most	real	being	ultimately	grounding	all	
reality.	Kant	clarifies	that	this	being	does	not	contain	all	reality	among	its	determinations,	since	
then	it	would	contain	within	itself	a	real	repugnancy	of	opposed	determinations	and	hence	a	
privation	(2:85–7).	Kanterian	counters	that	the	supreme	being	ought	to	be	able	to	contain	really	
opposed,	mutually	cancelling	realities	(235).	Moreover,	he	thinks	that	Kant	contradicts	himself	
by	claiming	that	the	supreme	being	not	only	is	the	ground	of	realities	that	can	oppose	and	
cancel	each	other	but	also	is	not	the	ground	of	the	negations	and	deficiencies	of	the	essences	of	
things	(237). 
 
The	final	step	of	Kant’s	proposed	proof	is	to	show	that	this	most	real	being	has	both	intellect	
and	will	and	is	thus	God.	Kanterian	claims	that	Kant’s	three	argument-sketches	for	that	
conclusion	(2:87f.)	are	all	either	inadequate,	because	non-demonstrative,	or	else	circular,	
because	dependent	on	physico-theology.	And	he	seizes	on	the	fact	that	Kant	admits	that	it	is	
the	non-philosophical,	‘ordinary’	physico-theology	(which	infers	a	divine	author	from	the	
experience	of	the	contingent	order	of	nature)	that	produces	a	conviction	that	is	‘unshakable’	
and	in	whose	footsteps	philosophical	speculation	quietly	follows	(2:118).	Kanterian	claims,	
further,	that	physico-theology	is	indistinguishable	from	the	Spinozism	Kant	instinctively	
opposes	unless	it	silently	draws	on	the	conception	of	a	providential	and	transcendent	God	
found	in	scripture.	Kanterian	thus	concludes	that	it	must	be	the	case	that	the	Beweisgrund	is	
‘written	against	the	background	of	the	assumed	truth	of	scriptural	revelation	…	The	
metaphysical	speculation	of	the	modal	argument	is	a	secondary	or	even	tertiary	project,	a	
fortress	to	defend,	in	the	loftier	realm	of	philosophy,	received	faith’	(251). 
 
Kanterian	is	right	that	looking	at	Kant’s	development	shows	him	experimenting	with	different	
ways	of	defending	commitments	to	theism	and	some	sort	of	future	life	without,	it	seems,	ever	
questioning	the	commitments	themselves.	And	he	is	right	that	Kant’s	two-prong	critical	
strategy	of	limiting	knowledge	for	the	sake	of	these	commitments	while	stressing	their	
connection	with	a	moral-practical	orientation	is	a	strategy	with	precedents	within	the	Christian	
tradition	and	particularly	within	German-Protestantism.	And	so	he	is	also	clearly	right	that	it	
would	be	naive	to	take	Kant’s	professed	rationalism	simply	at	face	value.	Kanterian’s	book	is	
useful	as	a	reminder	of	this.	However,	his	reductive	hermeneutic	framework	leads	him	to	see	
German-Protestantism	not	merely	as	influencing	Kant’s	thought,	but	instead	as	providing	a	set	
of	Archimedian	points	or	hinge	propositions	on	which	everything	else	must	turn.	His	readings	of	
individual	texts	are	at	their	most	tendentious	and	one-sided	precisely	where	he	finds	evidence	
that	Kant’s	‘articles	of	faith’	serve	this	foundational	role.	 
 
How	does	Luther’s	sola	scriptura	lead	to	the	morality	of	autonomy	and	the	religion	of	reason?	
How	does	the	sentiment	underlying	Luther’s	claim	that	‘reason	is	the	devil’s	whore’	(7)	develop	
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into	Kant’s	claim	that	religion	must	submit	unwillingly	to	the	critique	of	reason	(Axi)?	
Kanterian’s	commentary	does	not	address	such	questions.	Nor	does	it	address	the	question	
why	Kant	seems	quite	prepared	to	dispense	with	traditional	articles	of	faith	insofar	he	considers	
them	to	lie	outside	the	boundaries	of	reason.	These	questions	are	made	pressing	by	Kanterian’s	
interpretive	framework,	but	it	is	not	clear	how	they	could	be	addressed	within	that	framework. 
 
In	his	Epilogue,	Kanterian	does	briefly	address	some	of	the	heterodox	views	Kant	is	willing	to	
express	in	later	years.	In	the	Opus	postumum	drafts,	Kant	takes	the	idea	of	God	as	a	postulate	
of	practical	reason	in	what	looks	like	a	radical	new	direction.	He	claims	there	regarding	the	God	
that	exists	and	judges	him:	‘I,	the	human	being,	am	myself	this	being’	(21:25).	Kanterian	does	
not	attempt	to	portray	this	as,	say,	a	novel	expression	of	a	traditional	conception	of	divine	
omnipresence.	Instead,	he	links	the	passage	with	tradition	in	an	indirect	way:	‘this	
subjectification	is	the	fruit	of	Luther’s	spiritual	revolution’	(392).	And	maybe	it	is.	But	Kanterian	
thereby	leaves	us	with	a	paradox	that	is	at	odds	with	the	hermeneutic	framework	guiding	the	
rest	of	his	commentary.	
 
Kanterian’s	book	provides	a	wealth	of	material	inviting	us	to	reconsider	the	manner	and	degree	
to	which	Kant’s	early	thought	is	shaped	by	the	religious	tradition.	His	extensive	reference	to	
continental	scholarship	(by	Redmann,	Schmucker,	Kreimendahl,	Sala,	Theis	and	others)	is	a	
distinctive	and	valuable	contribution	toward	such	a	reconsideration.	And	his	own	attempt	at	
such	a	reconsideration	certainly	challenges	our	understanding	of	Kant	by	going	well	beyond	
even	so-called	‘theologically	affirmative’	readings	to	what	we	might	call	a	‘crypto-fideistic’	
reading.	But	since	the	plain	meaning	of	Kant’s	texts	does	not	by	itself	support	Kanterian’s	
reading,	its	plausibility	depends	heavily	on	his	hermeneutic	starting	point,	which	is	itself	
questionable.	
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